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The Marine and Coastal Area Act 2011
  Robert Makgill,* Director, North South Environmental Law, Auckland and Queenstown; 
Dr Hamish Rennie, Senior Lecturer, Department of Environmental Management, Lincoln University
IntroductionThe passing of the Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) 
Act (“MCAA”) by Parliament on 24 March 2011 establishes a new regime for recognition of customary rights and title 
over the foreshore and seabed. A Court of Appeal finding that the Maori Land Court had jurisdiction to determine claims of customary ownership of the foreshore and seabed in Ngati 
Apa v Attorney-General [2003] 3 NZLR 643 led to the previous Government’s enactment of the Foreshore and Seabed Act 
2004 (“FSA”). The FSA removed the ability of Maori to seek 
recognition of their customary or aboriginal title and vested 
beneficial ownership of the foreshore and seabed in the Crown, but allowed existing freehold title to remain. The perceived elimination of customary title under the FSA led to the creation of the Maori Party, as well as adverse reports 
by The Waitangi Tribunal (WAI 1071) and a United Nations 
Special Rapporteur (E/CN.4/2006/78/Add.3, 13 March 2006). Despite the criticism of the FSA it is worth noting that many of the provisions found under the MCAA are based on those found in the earlier enactment. This article provides some 
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comparison of the MCAA with the FSA. The principal intention of the article, however, is to describe and comment on the key components of the new legislation, particularly those that effect decision 
making under the Resource Management Act 1991 
(“RMA”).
Common ownership
PurposeThe purpose of the MCAA is to protect the legitimate 
interests of all New Zealanders, recognise the mana tuku iho exercised by iwi, hapu and whanau, provide for the exercise of customary interests in the marine and coastal area and acknowledge the Treaty of 
Waitangi (s 4). It does this primarily by repealing the FSA, and establishing different categories of rights to the marine and coastal area. In particular, it restores customary interests that the FSA had extinguished and divests the Crown and local authorities of title to the marine coastal area, creating the “common 
marine and coastal area” (“CMCA”) (s 11(3)). The commons is distinguished from existing freehold title and areas vested in the Crown as conservation areas, 
national parks or reserves (s 2(1) of the Conservation 
Act 1987 and s 2 of the Reserves Act 1977). Iwi, hapu and whanau groups are able to seek recognition of 
protected customary rights (“PCR”) and customary marine title (“CMT”) within the CMCA.
Extent of the marine and coastal areaThe CMCA means the marine and coastal area (“MCA”), excluding, as discussed, private title and 
conservation areas. The MCA is defined as meaning:“(a) … the area that is bounded,—“(i) on the landward side, by the line of mean high-water springs; and“(ii) on the seaward side, by the outer limits of the territorial sea; and“(b) includes the beds of rivers that are part of the coastal marine area (within the meaning of the 
Resource Management Act 1991); and“(c) includes the airspace above, and the water space (but not the water) above, the areas described in paragraphs (a) and (b); and“(d) includes the subsoil, bedrock, and other matter under the areas described in paragraphs (a) and (b) …”
This is effectively the same definition as used for the “foreshore and seabed” in the FSA. However, the 
coastal marine area (“CMA”) is defined under the 
RMA as meaning:
“the foreshore, seabed, and coastal water, and the air space above the water—(a) Of which the seaward boundary is the outer limits 
of the territorial sea:(b) Of which the landward boundary is the line of mean high water springs …”
C learly the definitions for the MCA and CMA are very similar. The principal difference between the two 
definitions is that water is included in the definition 
of the CMA but not in the definition of the MCA. The 
purpose of the RMA is the sustainable management of resources, whereas the purpose of the MCAA includes the exercise of customary interests which involves recognition of property rights. The drafters of the MCAA may have chosen to exclude water 
from the definition of the MCA in order to avoid any possibility that customary title to coastal water could be recognised.Another difference is that the MCA does not expressly include the seabed, but does include “the beds of 
rivers”. Rather it includes under (d) “the subsoil, bedrock, and other matter under the areas” bounded by the landward side of mean high water springs and the seaward side of the territorial sea. It is likely that the seabed is supposed to be caught by “other matter under the areas”. This is not clear, however, as the areas bounded by mean high water springs and the territorial sea are not provided with any physical 
description. This makes it difficult to say with certainty what the word “under” is meant to refer to in any physical sense.
The MCA definition is probably intended to cover 
the seabed. Nevertheless, the aforementioned lack of certainty could lead to questions of who exercises jurisdiction over the seabed within the CMCA. This is 
because the MCAA amends s 30(1)(d)(ii) of the RMA to provide that regional councils now have jurisdiction 
over:“… the occupation of space in, and the extraction of sand, shingle, shell, or other natural material from, the coastal marine area, to the extent that it is within the common marine and coastal area.”If the seabed is not part of the CMCA then regional councils will not exercise jurisdiction over such things as occupation of the seabed. Furthermore, 
the definition of CMCA excludes those parts of the 
MCA that are “specified freehold land”, or owned by the Crown as a conservation area, national park or 
reserve. That means s 30(1)(d)(ii) does not provide regional councils with jurisdiction over occupation and extraction of natural materials within parts 
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of the CMA that are held in Maori, private or Crown title. It appears that there is a lacuna under the 
RMA and MCAA concerning the legislative body that is responsible for ensuring that occupation and extraction of natural materials in those parts of the CMA are sustainably managed.
Freedom of access, �ishing and navigationThe issue of public access to the foreshore and seabed was particular contentious during progress of the MCAA through Parliament. Many expressed concern that public access might be excluded or charged for by Maori who gained customary title to the CMCA. 
Section 26 provides for the rights of individuals to access and engage in recreation in the CMCA without charge. These rights are subject to any wahi tapu conditions that might be set out in a CMT order or 
agreement pursuant to ss 78 and 79 of the MCAA.
Navigation rights to the entire MCA are protected 
under s 27. Rights of navigation are also subject to wahi tapu protection conditions. There is potential for rights of access and recreation to be confused with navigation rights as navigation, recreation and 
access are undefined. Recreation and access rights 
are confined to the CMCA, whereas navigation rights extend throughout the MCA. The difference between 
a ship temporarily moored to load/unload passengers for recreational activities (access right) and a ship 
temporarily moored to load/unload cargo, crew, equipment and passengers (navigation right) may be 
difficult to distinguish.
Fishing rights are preserved under s 28. Section 79(2) provides that while wahi tapu conditions may affect 
the exercise of fishing rights, they must not do so 
to the extent that such conditions prevent fishers 
from taking their lawful entitlement under fisheries legislation.
Protected customary rights
PCRs are a form of use right. In simple terms they convey upon the holder a right to use resources located 
in a particular area. PCRs can be obtained by either 
Court order or agreement. PCRs do not include fishing and commercial aquaculture activities, or activities relating to wildlife and marine mammals under the 
Wildlife Act 1953 or Marine Mammals Protection 
Act 1978. Activities based on spiritual or cultural associations are also excluded, unless manifested by a 
physical activity or resource use (s 51(2)(e)).
Exemption from sections 9 to 17 of the RMA
Section 52(1) provides that a PCR “may be exercised under a protected customary rights order or an 
agreement without a resource consent, despite any prohibition, restriction or imposition that would 
otherwise apply in or under ss 12 to 17 of the Resource 
Management Act 1991”.Thi s means inter alia that regional councils are not able to exercise their abatement, enforcement 
or prosecution powers under the RMA. Regional councils cannot, for example, take enforcement action in the event that the exercise of a customary right has an adverse effect on the environment under 
s 17 of the RMA.
Rather, the Minister of Conservation is empowered 
under s 56 to impose controls on the exercise of the 
customary right if it is likely to have a significant 
adverse effect on the environment. Section 56 is a major watering down of regional council powers in respect of compliance and enforcement under the 
RMA. Furthermore, it enables an increase in the scale of adverse effects than would otherwise be 
permitted under the RMA.
Sec tion 56 has the potential to enable activities that are inconsistent with the legislative regime 
under the RMA. In particular, activities that fail “to recognise and provide for” matters of national 
importance listed under s 6, or to achieve the 
purpose of sustainable management under s 5 of the 
RMA. Notably, one of the purposes of the MCAA is “to ensure the protection of the legitimate interests of 
all New Zealanders in the marine and coastal area 
of New Zealand” (s 4(1)(a)). It is conceivable that this section might be resorted to in the case where 
a PCR has a more than minor adverse effect on the 
environment that does not amount to a significant adverse effect. However, the rules of statutory 
interpretation likely mean that the specific wording 
of s 56 overrides the general wording of s 4.
Resource consents
Sect ion 20 makes it clear that nothing under the MCAA is intended to have retrospective effect on resource consents granted before the commencement of the Act, or activities lawfully undertaken without a resource consent or other 
authorisation. It is important to note that s 20 does not extend to cover pre-existing applications for 
resource consent. Nevertheless, applications for resource consents lodged prior to recognition of 
PCR or CMT are protected by ss 55(1) and 64(1). This 
is consistent with s 7 of the Interpretation Act 1999, 
which provides that “[a]n enactment does not have retrospective effect” (Of�icial Assignee v Petricevic 
[2011] 1 NZLR 467 (HC) at [31]–[40]; and Re Auckland 
City Council A127/05, 4 August 2005 (EC) at [17]–[19]).
4 www.rmla.org.nz
Section 55(3) further provides that the existence 
of a PCR does not affect certain grants of rights 
under the RMA. In particular, the existence of a 
PCR does not affect the grant of a coastal permit to enable existing aquaculture activities or existing 
nationally or regionally significant infrastructure 
(and associated operations under s 63). However, 
while s 55(3)(d) provides that the existence of a 
PCR does not limit or otherwise affect the grant 
of a resource consent for specific infrastructure activities (prospecting, exploration or mining), 
s 55(4) states that the consent authority must have 
particular regard to the nature of the PCR when considering an application for these activities.
Commercial use of rightsThe FSA test for determining whether a customary 
rights order could be made was whether:“(b) the activity, use, or practice for which the 
applicant seeks a customary rights order –… “(ii) has been carried on, exercised, or followed in accordance with tikanga Maori in a 
substantially uninterrupted manner since 
1840 …” (ss 50(1)(b)(ii) and 74(1)(b)(ii)), emphasis added)
Significantly, s 51(1) under the MCAA provides that a 
PCR is a right that:
“(a) has been exercised since 1840; and“(b) continues to be exercised in a particular part of the common marine and coastal area in accordance with tikanga … whether it continues to be exercised 
in exactly the same way or a similar way, or evolves 
over time …” (emphasis added)
Section 51(1)(b) is a marked step away from the provision for customary rights orders under the FSA insofar as those rights are allowed to change over time. In contrast the FSA required such rights to be continued “to be carried on, exercised, or followed … in accordance with tikanga Maori” (s 
50(1)(b)(iii)) or “the distinctive cultural practices 
of the group …” (s 74(1)(b)(iii)). Section 51(1)(b) 
opens up the possibility for PCR groups to argue that they exercise a much wider set of rights than those that might otherwise be associated with traditional practices. In particular, there is scope for the traditional form of a right to be exercised on a grander commercial scale. This view is supported 
by s 52(4)(b) which enables a PCR group to “derive 
commercial benefit from exercising its protected customary rights”.
Further, the particular privileges and exemptions from the general law which are conferred by the MCAA on claimant groups, are able to be transferred to and enjoyed by any other group or 
person identified in a PCR order or agreement. 
Under ss 52(4)(a) and 53 a protected customary rights group may delegate or transfer the rights order or agreement in accordance with tikanga. 
The delegation or transfer must be notified and 
registered in accordance with ss 110 and 114.
Customary marine titleThe MCAA makes provision for the recognition of CMT that has not been extinguished. This may be recognised through either a “recognition agreement” with the Crown, which can only be brought into effect by an Act of Parliament, or through a “recognition order” made by the High Court. The criteria for recognition of CMT are set 
out in s 58.
Section 58(1) provides that CMT exists in a specified 
area of the CMCA if the applicant group:
“(a) holds the specified area in accordance with 
tikanga, and 
“ (b) has, in relation to the specified area, - “(i)  exclusively used and occupied it from 1840 to the present day without substantial 
interruption; or
“(ii)  received it, at any time after 1840, through a customary transfer [in accordance with 
tikanga … ] … ” (emphasis added)
Tikanga is defined under the MCAA as “Maori 
customary values and practices” (s 9). The terms “exclusively used and occupied” and “substantial 
interruption” are not defined.This test is the crux of much of the political debate 
– how extensive might such title be and what might be the implications? A key distinction between the MCAA and the FSA is that the FSA required that “the group had continuous title to contiguous land” 
(s 32(2)(b)) for exclusive use and occupancy to be proven. The MCAA weakens this test substantially. The ownership of land abutting all or part of the area for which CMT is sought is a matter that may 
be taken into account. Furthermore, the definition of “abutting” makes it clear the land does not have to 
be contiguous (s 59(4)).The new test borrows considerably from the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Delgamuukw v 
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British Columbia [1997] 3 SCR 1010. In that decision 
the Supreme Court made the following findings:
(a) Occupation:
“[154] …  the fact that the nature of occupation has changed would not ordinarily preclude a claim for aboriginal title, as long as a substantial connection between the people and the land is maintained.” 
(b) Exclusive use and occupation:
“[155] The requirement for exclusivity flows from 
the definition of aboriginal title itself, because I have 
defined aboriginal title in terms of the right to exclusive 
use and occupation of land. Exclusivity, as an aspect of aboriginal title, vests in the aboriginal community which holds the ability to exclude others from the lands held pursuant to that title. The proof of title must, in this respect, mirror the content of the right. …
“[156] However, as the common law concept of possession must be sensitive to the realities of aboriginal society, so must the concept of exclusivity. 
Exclusivity is a common law principle derived from the notion of fee simple ownership and should be imported into the concept of aboriginal title with caution. As such, the test required to establish exclusive occupation must take into account the context of the aboriginal society at the time of sovereignty. For example, it is important to note that exclusive occupation can be demonstrated even if other aboriginal groups were 
present, or frequented the claimed lands. Under those circumstances, exclusivity would be demonstrated by “the intention and capacity to retain exclusive control…” 
(c) Interruption:
“[198] I agree that there is no need to establish an unbroken chain of continuity and that interruptions in 
occupancy or use do not necessarily preclude a finding of “title”. I would go further, however, and suggest that the presence of two or more aboriginal groups in a territory may also have an impact on continuity of use. For instance, one aboriginal group may have ceded its possession to subsequent occupants or merged its territory with that of another aboriginal society. As well, the occupancy of one aboriginal society may be connected to the occupancy of another society by conquest or exchange. In these circumstances, continuity of use and occupation, extending back to the relevant time, may very well be established.” 
If the New Zealand courts decide to adopt the approach taken by the Canadian Supreme Court in the Delgamuukw decision it is likely that “exclusive use and occupation” would be demonstrated by a 
“substantial connection” between the people and the land, together with both the intention and capacity to retain exclusive control notwithstanding the presence of another tribe. This may include persons 
without a tribal affiliation (s 59(3)). Moreover s 59(3) 
states that the use of a specified area for fishing or navigation by non-applicants does not of itself preclude the applicant group from establishing CMT.Furthermore, “substantial interruption” is likely to be treated as a fairly strong test requiring something more than the cession of possession from one group to another. Indeed the MCAA envisages transfers in accordance with tikanga from one group to another and continues the FSA provision for a binding opinion to be sought from the Maori Appellate Court 
as to whether tikanga has been followed (s 99).The Delgamuukw decision does not discount the possibility of shared exclusive occupation. In 
particular, the Supreme Court observed, at [158], 
that:“The meaning of shared exclusivity is well-known to 
the common law. Exclusive possession is the right to exclude others. Shared exclusive possession is the right to exclude others except those with whom possession is shared. There clearly may be cases in which two aboriginal nations lived on a particular piece of land and recognized each other’s entitlement to that land but nobody else’s.” The provisions under the MCAA for recognition of CMT are not as restrictive as the tests that were provided for under the FSA. It is possible 
that significantly greater areas of the CMCA will have CMT recognized under the MCAA than the equivalent territorial customary right formerly available under the FSA. It is important therefore to understand the nature of the rights and the degree to which they might constrain others. 
RMA permission rights 
Recognition of CMT may significantly impact on new applications for coastal permits other than for 
renewal of existing permits or use rights. Resource consents for activities within CMT areas will 
require an “RMA permission right” from the CMT 
group (s 66). The group has complete discretion as to whether to grant the right. However, once granted a permission right cannot be revoked. In granting a permission the group must specify the activity permitted, “the applicant who is to have 
the benefit of the permission” and the duration of the permission. The permission does not have to 
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be for the same period as the consent, and there do not appear to be any provisions for transfer of a permission once granted. This could pose 
significant difficulties to a consent holder seeking to transfer a resource consent to another person. Applicants cannot exercise a resource consent until they have obtained a permission right. The CMT 
group has 40 working days within which to grant or decline the application. If there has been no decision within that timeframe the permission is deemed to have been granted for the duration of the consent 
(s 67).
Conservation permission rightConservation permission rights enable CMT groups to give or decline permission, on any grounds, for the Minister or Director-General of Conservation 
to consider an application or proposal for specified 
conservation activities within a CMT area (s 71). Those activities are the declaration or extension of a marine reserve or a conservation protected area, or an application for a concession. However, if 
the Minister or Director-General is satisfied that a proposal for protecting an area is for a purpose of national importance then they may proceed without permission from the group. The power to override a CMT group’s decision does not extend to concessions 
(s 74).
Accommodated activitiesAccommodated activities are activities that 
are expressly excluded from needing an RMA permission right or a conservation permission 
right (s 63). Section 64(2) defines accommodated 
activities as meaning inter alia:
• any activity authorised by resource consent if the application for consent is made prior to recognition of CMT;
• resource consents, whenever granted, for a 
minimum impact activity (under s 2(1) of the 
Crown Minerals Act 1991) related to petroleum;
• infrastructure that is lawfully established and is reasonably necessary to national social or economic well-being, or the wellbeing of the region in which it is located (accommodated infrastructure);
• resource consents required for management of existing reserves, sanctuaries or concessions;
• a coastal permit to continue an existing aquaculture activity;
• activities undertaken to prevent, remove or reduce danger to human health, the environment or property (emergency activity); and 
• scientific research or monitoring by the Crown or a regional council.
With the exception of accommodated infrastructure, 
emergency activities and scientific research or monitoring all of the accommodated activities 
listed under s 64(2) involve resource consents. It is not immediately clear what kinds of conservation 
activities might come within the definition of an accommodated activity.
Planning documents
Among the rights conferred under s 62 for CMT areas is the right to create a planning document 
(s 62(1)(g)). Planning documents could have 
significant ramifications for the preparation and contents of regional planning documents under 
the RMA. No right of objection or appeal rights to 
the Environment Court apply to the preparation of planning documents.
Section 85(2) of the MCAA provides that a planning document can only make provision for issues, 
objectives and policies. Rule making is therefore retained as the preserve of regional councils. The objectives and policies that can be provided 
for under s 85(3) include those that relate to (a) sustainable management of the CMT area, and (b) protection of cultural identity and historic heritage 
of the group (s 85(2)(a) and (b)). Section 85(3)(a) and (b), on the face of it, appear to indicate that planning documents principally are intended to address matters of cultural and heritage value.However, the use of the words “may include” in 
s 85(3) indicates that the matters under paragraphs 
(a) and (b) are not definitive and that there are other matters that might be addressed in a planning document. This may be appropriate insofar as a planning document is intended to be taken into account or regarded by agencies subject to different 
legislation to the RMA (ss 88 to 91). The breadth 
of the word “include” under s 85(3) of the MCAA, however, lends itself to the possibility that CMT groups could set out objectives and policies in their planning documents on a range of matters that extend beyond those commonly understood as ones of cultural or heritage concern. It is not inconceivable that a planning document could make provision for a more liberal set of objectives and policies governing the use and development of resources in a CMT area than those found in the applicable regional planning documents.
Regional councils must in turn initiate a process to determine whether to alter their regional documents (regional policy statements and plans) in order to “recognise and provide for” any matters in the planning document relevant to the CMT area, if 
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and to the extent that it would achieve the purpose 
of the RMA (s 93(6)). In making a determination a regional council must consider the extent to which alterations must be made to its regional documents to “recognise and provide for the matters” in a planning document relevant to the CMT. This is a weighty requirement.It require s regional councils to do something more than “have regard to” or “take into account”. Positive 
action is necessary – provision must be made for the matters included in a planning document. The 
Environment Court has found, in respect of s 6 of the 
RMA, that the matters subject to that requirement 
have a significant priority and cannot be merely an equal part of a general balancing exercise (Bleakley 
v Environmental Risk Management Authority [2001] 3 
NZLR 213 (HC)).It is quest ionable whether such weight should be placed on a planning document that has not been subject to the public participation procedures of 
the RMA. The requirement to make provision for planning documents contrasts with the requirement for regional councils and territorial authorities to simply “take into account” planning documents 
recognised by iwi authorities under ss 61(2A)(a), 
66(2A)(a) and 74(2A) of the RMA. This difference 
reflects recognition of the CMT underpinning the related planning document, but seems inconsistent with the weight accorded to other iwi planning documents with a terrestrial or freshwater focus that may also encompass lands to which Maori hold title.Finally, it is noted that applications for private plan changes in CMT areas, if not rejected or considered as resource consents, must be adopted by councils 
(s 93(12)). This clearly shifts the costs to the council and it is unclear whether funds will be provided from central government to meet such costs. Arguably the MCAA is a Treaty-based settlement and the costs of promulgating plans if adopted should be met by central government.
Commercial use of title
CMT groups are entitled under s 60(2)(a) to exercise the rights conferred under a CMT in order to derive 
commercial benefit. The holder of a CMT would presumably also apply for the lesser entitlements 
of a PCR. Together these rights could provide their 
holders with a significant level of autonomy over the use and development of resources within the CMCA.Furthermore, like customary rights groups, CMT groups have the power to delegate rights, or transfer 
CMT, in accordance with tikanga (s 60(3)). However, the transfer may only be to persons who belong to 
the same iwi or hapu as the CMT group (s 61(1)(a)). The recipient of the transfer will have the same 
benefits and exemptions as the group in respect of future activities within the scope of the CMT. These 
rights include RMA and conservation permissions rights, the ownership of minerals (other than minerals reserved under the Crown Minerals Act 
1991 and pounamu) and the creation of planning documents.
ConclusionThe MCAA protects existing rights of resource 
consent holders and provides significantly greater scope for Maori groups to gain customary use and property rights than was available under the FSA. It weakens tests that applied under the FSA. When combined with MCAA planning documents it is apparent that tangata whenua have considerably 
greater potential to influence the future of coastal and marine planning and management than in the past.The MCAA effectively creates two parallel but separate sets of laws governing resource use and development in CMT areas. One set is applicable by CMT groups, while another would be applicable to anybody else wishing to undertake an activity in a CMT area. The statutory regime under the MCAA provides an alternative approach to that of Maori freehold land outside the CMCA. It is considered hard to justify the application of local authority powers and functions in respect of Maori freehold land above mean high water springs but not within the CMCA. It will be interesting to see whether the acquisition of new property rights and planning powers will result in positive outcomes for coastal management.
* Robert Makgill was legal counsel to Local Government New 
Zealand in respect of its submissions to the Maori Affairs Select 
Committee on the Marine and Coastal Area Bill 2010.
